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This study examines the economic returns to beauty and unprotected sex in the commercial 
sex market in Bangladesh. The results show that there is a beauty premium for commercial 
sex work, but it is within the bounds of the economic returns to beauty for women in 
occupations that do not involve sex work. We find that there is an earnings premium for sex 
workers who sell unprotected sex and that more attractive sex workers charge a higher 
premium for unprotected sex. This result is consistent with either attractive sex workers 
having more bargaining/negotiating power or attractiveness and risky sex being complements 
for males in the presence of attractive women. The results are robust to a number of empirical 
specifications including controls for sex workers’ disposition, client characteristics and a 
number of fixed effects to control for other attributes of sex workers and their clients. 
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Beginning with Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), there is a growing body of literature that 
estimates economic returns to beauty in different contexts (see eg. Biddle & Hamermesh, 
1998; Hamermesh, 2006; Leigh & Borland, 2007; Price, 2008; Johnson, 2010). There are also 
a growing number of studies that estimate economic returns to commercial sex work  (see 
Cameron  et al., 1999; Edlund & Korn, 2002; Rao et al., 2003; Moffatt & Peters, 2004; 
Gertler et al., 2005; Robinson & Yeh, 2006; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2007; Arunachalam & 
Shah, 2008, 2010; Edlund et al., 2009; Della Giusta et al., 2009, Logan & Shah, 2009). 
Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) pointed out that beauty should only matter in occupations in 
which looks are economically important. Commercial sex work should be one such 
occupation, given the nature of the service provided. However, to this point, the only study 
that has explicitly estimated the earnings premium for beauty in commercial sex work is 
Arunachalam and Shah (2010), who estimate the beauty premium for female commercial sex 
workers in Ecuador and Mexico. While one might expect the beauty premium for commercial 
sex work to be higher than for non-sex work, these authors find estimates that are similar in 
magnitude to the beauty premium for females not doing sex work. Considerable evidence 
from experiments suggests that attractive people are in a superior position when bargaining 
with others and that they are treated better because of their looks (see Mulford et al., 1998; 
Eckel & Wilson, 2005; Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999). One possible explanation for this result 
might be that more attractive people are better negotiators (Rosenblat, 2008).  
 
A feature of the commercial sex market, that is not evident in most occupations in which 
appearance matters, is that it is a high-risk occupation.  HIV infection has been spreading 
rapidly among individuals engaging in high-risk sex practices and commercial sex workers 




HIV virus worldwide, a large proportion of whom are infected through unprotected sex with 
sex workers (UNAIDS, 2009). Previous studies have found that sex workers receive a wage 
premium for engaging in unprotected sex (Rao et al., 2003; Gertler et al., 2005). That 
commercial sex work is a risky occupation, combined with the fact that attractiveness is 
potentially an important determinant of earnings potential, provides the opportunity to 
examine how attractiveness and risk interrelate to affect economic returns. 
 
In lab experiments the stakes over which players bargain are relatively modest. In the 
commercial sex sector, given the risk of HIV infection and other STDs, the stakes are very 
high and potentially a matter of life and death. If attractive people have more bargaining 
power, perhaps because their negotiation skills are better, one would expect that more 
attractive sex workers would be able to charge a higher premium for supplying unprotected 
sex. One would expect the bargaining power of the attractive sex worker might be enhanced 
because of the setting in which the transaction takes place. Ditto et al. (2006) found that 
visceral cues indicating proximity to objects of desire can lead people to be 
disproportionately influenced by the anticipated rewards of immediate gratification, rather 
than the risks of consummatory behaviour. Males that are exposed to arousing sexual stimuli, 
such as the prospect of having sex with an attractive woman, having made the decision to 
engage a sex worker, are likely to overvalue the immediate returns of sexual gratification in 
order to gain what Buss and Schmitt (1993) call ‘short-term opportunistic copulation’. 
 
In a series of experiments Van den Bergh and Dewitte (2006) demonstrate that males exposed 
to arousing stimuli, such as viewing pictures of attractive women or handling lingerie, 
yielded lower minimum acceptance rates in subsequent ultimatum bargaining games. The 




thus become more willing to accept any offer at the expense of fairness norms. Wilson and 
Daly (2004) found that the prospect of sexual gratification generates steeper time discounting 
in males. Ariely and Lowenstein (2006) examined the effect of sexual arousal on decision-
making of college-age males and found that, when aroused, males find a much wider range of 
sexual activities appealing; are more willing to engage in morally questionable behaviour to 
obtain sexual gratification; and are more willing to engage in unprotected sex.  
 
In this paper we estimate the returns to physical attractiveness and risky sex for a sample of 
sex workers in Bangladesh. We find that there is a beauty premium for commercial sex work, 
but, consistent with Arunachalam and Shah (2010), it is within the bounds of the economic 
returns to beauty for women in other occupations. We find that the beauty premium is 
consistent with employer discrimination whereby the brothel madams contract for the 
services of better looking sex workers. Our results also indicate an earnings premium for sex 
workers who sell unprotected sex. More attractive sex workers receive a higher premium for 
selling unprotected sex. This result reflects the fact that more attractive sex workers have a 
higher opportunity cost of selling unprotected sex because their expected lifetime earnings 
are higher. Two potential explanations for this finding are that attractive sex workers have 
more bargaining power when negotiating the transaction price or that attractiveness and risky 
sex are complements in a client’s utility function (Gertler et al., 2005).  
The Market for Commercial Sex in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is an interesting country to study the commercial sex market because HIV 
remains at relatively low levels for most-at-risk population groups. UNAIDS estimates that 
about 12,000 Bangladeshis were living with HIV at the end of 2007. This figure represents 
less than 0.1 per cent of the general population (World Bank, 2009). However, while the 




among high-risk groups. Among the chief risk factors is Bangladesh’s large commercial sex 
market. In 2000, the Bangladeshi High Court ruled that brothel-based female sex work is 
legal if the brothel is properly licensed, making Bangladesh one of the few Islamic countries 
that permits prostitution (BBC, 2000). There are 105,000 sex workers in Bangladesh; of 
whom about 100,000 are female sex workers. Most female sex workers are adolescents or 
young women, with the majority aged 15 to 18. In most cases, female sex workers will have 
retired by age 30 (Alam, 2010). More than 20,000 children live in brothels and red light 
districts in Bangladesh and many of the girls are expected to follow their mothers into 
prostitution. Younger children living in brothels help their mothers with household chores 
and serve refreshments to their mother’s clients. Many girls enter prostitution in Bangladesh 
before the age of 12 (ECPAT, 2006). Based on ethnographic fieldwork, Brown (2005, 2007) 
and Orchard (2007) document the existence of successive generations of sex workers within 
the one family where mothers provide networks for their daughters introducing them to rich 
clients. Brown’s (2005, 2007) research focused on elite prostitution in Lahore in Pakistan and 
Orchard’s (2007) research centred on rural India, but the practice is similar in Bangladesh. 
 
The two major categories of female sex workers in Bangladesh are those who work in 
brothels, and floating sex workers. Floating sex workers are either hotel-based or street-
based. Brothel-based female sex workers see approximately 18 clients per week, while street-
based and hotel-based sex workers see an average of 17 and 44 clients per week respectively 
(World Bank, 2009). There are 14 official brothels in Bangladesh and 18 official red light 
districts, which are mostly located in either the commercial centre of cities or at river 
junctions or seaports where there is a lot of through traffic and transient clients. Clusters of 
small rented rooms usually constitute a brothel, which is regulated by the local authority. 





There is a clear hierarchy within the brothel (see Kotiswaran, 2008). At the top of the 
hierarchy are the local land owners (jamidars) who lease land to the homeowners (bariwali). 
The bariwali build housing that is rented to the brothel managers (sardarnis). The sardarnis 
employ  adhiya, who in exchange for a place to stay, give half of their earnings to the 
sardarnis. The sardarnis will typically charge the adhiya sex worker extra for clothing, food 
and medical care and the adhiya bears the burden of illness. At the bottom of the hierarchy 
are bonded sex workers (chukris), who are bonded to the sardarnis. The sardarnis usually 
make a down payment to either agents who sell sex workers or the sex worker’s relatives or 
associates for contracting the services of the sex worker. The chukris is required to work for 
the  sardarnis  until she earns enough for the latter to pay off the down payment. The 
conditions of work for the chukris are harsh as the sardarnis attempts to extract as much 
income as possible. The chukris has no time for leisure, often has no choice over  clients or 
sexual practices and is unable to insist that the client uses a condom. When chukris sex 
workers have paid off their debts, they will often work for a sardarnis on an adhiya basis.  
 
Condom use among clients of female sex workers in Bangladesh is variable. According to 
sixth round Behavioral Surveillance Survey (BSS, 2006-2007) data, condom use was 70 per 
cent for clients of brothels and ranged between 51 per cent and 81 per cent for clients of street 
workers. Condom use was lowest among hotel-based sex workers in Dhaka and Chittagong at 
40 per cent and 36 per cent respectively. Hotel-based sex workers are particularly vulnerable 
to HIV as they have the largest number of clients. The higher rate of condom use in brothels 
reflects the fact that licensed brothels are legal, making it easier for health officials to 
distribute condoms (BBC, 2000). Consistent condom use with regular clients is lower for sex 
workers in brothels, hotels and on the street. Syphilis rates are relatively high among sex 
workers in all categories, but particularly among hotel and street-based workers, indicating 




estimate is that just 1 per cent of sex workers in Bangladesh are HIV positive (Hammond, 
2008), although another estimate suggests as many as 40 per cent have an STD (Alam, 2010). 
Data Description and Survey Design 
The survey employed in this study was initially undertaken with the purpose of understanding 
the socio-economic profile and living circumstances of commercial sex workers in 
Bangladesh. It was administered by the Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies (BIDS) 
with financial assistance from UNDP in 2005, as a project under the auspices of the Ministry 
of Social Welfare in Bangladesh. The survey was administered with the assistance of NGOs 
working with the sex workers in the relevant geographic area. The first author was part of the 
research team which designed and administered the survey. The survey enumerators 
consisted of both males and females, each of whom was experienced in survey techniques. 
Separate sets of enumerators were used in each of the brothels and red light districts. Prior to 
conducting the interviews a training session was organized for the enumerators, focusing 
specifically on appropriate methods for interviewing sex workers. All interviews were 
conducted in a manner designed to engender a sense of confidence and self-respect in the sex 
workers and with particular recognition that some sex workers were underage. In addition to 
collecting information on a range of demographic and personal characteristics of the sex 
worker as well as detailed earnings and labour supply data, each enumerator was asked to 
assess the attractiveness of the sex worker from the perspective of a potential client on a scale 
of one to four. While acknowledging that this is a crude way of measuring beauty, given that 
it is likely to be a multidimensional construct by its very nature, unfortunately the survey 
does not contain a multidimensional measure of beauty. The measure used here is similar to 
that used in previous studies. For example, it is similar to the measure used in surveys of sex 





The survey was administered in three official brothels and four official red light districts. The 
three brothels located in Daulatdia, Jessore and Mymensingh are among the largest brothels 
in Bangladesh. Daulatdia is the largest brothel in Bangladesh and one of the largest in the 
world. It is situated on the meeting point of two rivers, the Jamuna and the Ganges, about 100 
kilometres from Dhaka. It is a hub for ferries and trucks queue here for two to three days to 
cross the river for the drive to Dhaka. The Daulatdia brothel is so large it is a village in its 
own right with a large number of alleyways containing 2,300 single-story rooms, used to 
service clients. In many respects it has the appearance of a normal village with a vast street 
market with lines of fruit and vegetable stalls. The only visible difference between Daulatdia 
and other villages in Bangladesh is the presence of large numbers of women on the street 
(Hammond, 2008). In Daulatdia there are more than 2,000 female sex workers who sell sex to 
approximately 3,000 men every day. Approximately 300 children live in Daulatdia with their 
mothers and most sex workers living in Daulatdia express the hope that their daughters will 
join them working in the brothel as soon as they are old enough (Hammond, 2008).   
 
Jessore is located in South-west Bangladesh and encompasses three small brothels adjacent to 
each other; namely, Jhalai Patti, Marwari Mondir and Babu Bazar. Of these, Marwari Mondir 
is the largest and most profitable of the Jessore brothels. Jhalai Patti is in a state of disrepair 
and the least profitable, while Babu Bazar is in-between the two. The survey was 
administered in Jhalai Patti, Marwari Mondir and Babu Bazar. Mymensingh is located in the 
north of Bangladesh. It is relatively old and is situated at the centre of the city. The brothel at 
Mymensingh consists of eleven three-storied buildings and almost 100 tin-shed houses. There 
are approximately five hundred female sex workers living and working in Mymensingh. 
 
The floating sex workers were mainly located in red light districts in Dhaka. Most had 




become floating after the brothels in which they had worked were dismantled by local 
authorities. There are several NGOs working with sex workers in these red light districts and 
the NGOs were crucial in securing the cooperation of the participating sex workers. The 
floating sex workers that participated in the study congregated in the red light districts in 
locations such as bus stops, parks railway stations, shrines and outside cinemas and markets. 
Most of these sex workers negotiated with their clients without the services of a pimp.  
 
A total of 283 sex workers were interviewed, with about 40 sex workers from each of the 
brothels and red light districts. Hence, of the 283 sex workers surveyed, 123 were from the 
three brothels and the remainder were floating sex workers from the red light districts in 
Dhaka.  The sampling was not completely random because the exact number and 
characteristics of sex workers in each location is not known. This is particularly true of 
floating sex workers, where a snowball sampling approach was used to select sex workers 
willing to be interviewed. Based on anecdotal accounts of the characteristics of this 
population, and independent surveys of sex workers in Bangladesh (see eg. Akm, 2005), we 
are relatively confident that this sample is fairly representative of sex workers in Bangladesh.  
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample broken down according to whether the 
participants worked in a brothel or was floating. The mean age of sex workers in the brothels 
was 27.8, while the mean age of floating sex workers was 26.0. Hence, participants in the 
survey were slightly older than the average sex worker in Bangladesh. A plausible 
explanation for this phenomenon is that older sex workers might feel more secure in 
themselves and their occupation and, as such, be more willing to participate in such a survey. 
The average length of time in the profession was 7.7 years for sex workers in the brothels and 
12.3 years for floating sex workers. Hence, approximately 90 per cent of the sample 




workers in the brothels commencing in the profession below the age of 18. The highest 
education level attained by the sex workers was generally low; 58.5 per cent had not 
completed primary school, 31.7 per cent had completed primary school, 7.5 per cent had 
completed secondary school and just 0.3 per cent had a post-secondary qualification. About 
one quarter (26 per cent) of floating sex workers were married or had been married in the 
past, while the corresponding figure for sex workers in brothels was much higher (67 per 
cent). About two-thirds of participants (66.5 per cent) had children. The mean number of 
children per participant was 1.15 and the mean age of the children was 9 years. Most of the 
sex workers in the sample were Muslim (96.1 per cent), with others being Hindu (2.1 per 
cent), Christian (0.7 per cent) and Buddhist (0.7 per cent). Overall, 6.4 per cent of 
participants reported that their mother had also been a sex worker, although for sex workers 
in brothels this number was 14 per cent, while for floating sex workers it was just 1 per cent. 
 
Participants were asked to voluntarily report if they are infected with STDs such as 
gonorrhea, syphilis, hepatitis-B, genital warts or HIV -related illness. One quarter of sex 
workers in brothels and one-third of floating sex workers reported having had an STD. Just 
over one quarter of floating sex workers (27 per cent) and just under one half of sex workers 
in brothels (46 per cent) reported having regular health checks. About two-thirds of sex 
workers had been tested for HIV, while 80 per cent had regular blood tests. A high proportion 
of sex workers reported having had an abortion; 46 per cent of sex workers in brothels and 25 
per cent of floating sex workers reported having had one or more abortions. The survey found 
that there were also several cases of miscarriage, although these were less than the number of 





In terms of beauty, on a scale of one to four where one is least attractive and four is most 
attractive, 19 per cent of sex workers were rated one, 43 per cent were rated two, 28 per cent 
were rated three and 10 per cent of sex workers were rated four. Sex workers in brothels were 
consistently rated more beautiful than floating sex workers. Floating sex workers see on 
average 4.4 clients per day, while sex workers in brothels see 4.05 clients per day. The 
average price per transaction charged by floating sex workers (96.4 taka or US$1.40 at 2005 
exchange rates) is slightly higher than the average transaction price in brothels (82.9 taka or 
US$1.20 at 2005 exchange rates). Overall 69 per cent of sex workers reported that their 
clients regularly used a condom. Condom use in brothels (76 per cent) was higher than 
among floating sex workers (64 per cent). The average transaction price is higher for 
unprotected sex than for sex with a condom for both floating sex workers and sex workers in 
brothels.  Floating sex workers work on average 20.4 days per month, while sex workers in 
brothels work 25.6 days per month. Hence, while sex workers in brothels charge less than 
floating sex workers per transaction, their monthly income from sex work is higher. Sex 
workers in brothels earned 7355 taka (US$113.3) per month, while floating sex workers 
earned 8776 takas (US$134.9) per month from sex work. Sex workers earn much more than 
females in the rest of the labour market. The median average monthly income for females in 
Bangladesh was less than 750 takas (or US$11.50) per month and just 1.5 per cent of females 
earned in excess of 7500 takas (or US$115.3) per month in 2005 (ADB, 2005).  
 
The average number of clients per day that sex workers see and the age of the sex worker 
were inversely related.  Sex workers aged 12-17 spend approximately 50 minutes with each 
client, while older sex workers spend more than one hour with each client. This result is 
consistent with findings for sex workers in the United States. Edlund et al. (2009) found that 




considered less desirable, spent extra time with clients for each transaction. The average age 
of clients was 29.7 years with 86 per cent of clients aged 23-35.  About 70 per cent of 
floating sex workers and 80 per cent of sex workers in brothels have permanent clients. In 
brothels, such as Daulatdia, the permanent clients often run shops within the brothel. The 
prevalence of unprotected sex with permanent clients is much higher than with casual clients. 
Empirical Specification and Econometric Methodology 
We regress log of monthly earnings from sex work on a variable depicting whether the sex 
worker is attractive (on a scale of one to four where 1= “not attractive” and 4= “most 
attractive”) as assessed by the enumerator from the perspective of a potential client, a dummy 
variable equal to one if the sex worker practices safe sex and a series of control variables: 
Ln Wi = β1Xi +β2Beautyi+ γCondomi + ε1 i         (1) 
Here Wi is the average monthly earnings from sex work of sex worker i, Condomi is a dummy 
variable denoting if a particular sex worker practices safe sex, proxied by whether clients 
‘regularly use condoms’, Xi is a vector of characteristics of the sex worker, β1 and γ are 
vectors of unknown parameters, and ε1i is an error term. The beauty term helps control for an 
important source of unobserved heterogeneity. Alternatively, it can be regarded as a measure 
of unobserved productivity in our context. We use average monthly earnings, rather than 
average hourly earnings, because sex workers in Bangladesh charge per act, rather than per 
hour. When estimating Equation (1) we control for the average number of clients per day and 
number of days worked per month. We focus on average monthly earnings from sex work 
rather than price per act because discussions with sex workers indicated that price per act is 
fairly competitive. There is not a lot of variation in price per act between sex workers with 
different characteristics, in order to keep the price per act within the range of what the 




characteristics is in terms of the number of clients wanting to see them each day and the 
number of days they are in demand each month. In robust analysis, reported below, we also 
estimate Equation (1) with the price per act as the dependent variable. Estimating Equation 
(1) with price per act as the dependent variable is an important robust check because 
theoretically beauty might, in part, proxy for health measures not captured by our health 
variables, such as stamina, and healthy workers may be better placed to work longer hours. 
However, when we take price per act as the dependent variable, the main conclusions with 
respect to the earnings premium for attractiveness and unprotected sex remain the same. 
 
In Equation (1) the vector of characteristics of the sex worker are human capital 
characteristics (age, education, experience, health status - have regular health check- ups, test 
for HIV, blood test, have an STD); labour supply and personal characteristics (marital status, 
children, religion, sterilized, use oral contraception, had abortion, miscarried, income from 
other sources, clients per day, days worked, number of partners in private sex life, sex worker 
is happy, sex worker suffers discrimination, sex worker is abused by police and whether the 
sex worker works in a brothel or is floating); sex worker’s familial situation (mother was a 
sex worker, parents approve of their daughter being a sex worker) and client characteristics 
(has permanent clients, clients are rich, clients are attractive, clients use condom, sex worker 
charges less if clients use condom, client age and sex worker is abused by clients). The 
regressions also control for the sex worker’s place of birth, occupation of her clients and type 
of sex act (anal, hand simulation, oral, vaginal or hugging and kissing). The regression results 
reported below also use fixed effects to control for specific brothels and red light areas. As 
separate enumerators were employed to interview sex workers in each brothel and red light 




since enumerators may assess beauty in different ways and not controlling for enumerator 
fixed effects in this manner could potentially bias the attractiveness variable. 
 
We expect the coefficient on beauty to be positive, consistent with the existence of an 
earnings premium for beauty. We expect the coefficient on condom use to be negative. 
Unprotected sex is a compensating wage differential for riskier work activities. Risks 
associated with the client not using a condom include STDs and HIV infection. Among the 
control variables, we expect the coefficient on age to be negative. Edlund and Korn (2002) 
hypothesis that sex workers’ earnings follow a hump-shape pattern, reflecting foregone 
marriage market opportunities. Edlund et al. (2009) found support for this hypothesis in a 
sample of sex workers in the United States with wages peaking in the 26-30 age bracket, 
which coincides with the most intensive marriage ages in the United States. However, in 
Bangladesh, female sex workers commence working at much younger ages. Clients pay a 
premium for sex with adolescent and teenage girls with earnings dropping off once a sex 
worker is into her twenties. For example, Hammond (2008) reports that in Daulatida, 
underage sex workers can earn as much as 10 times more than sex workers in their twenties.  
 
We expect a positive sign on the coefficient for education. Better educated sex workers have 
a higher opportunity cost. Education is likely to be positively correlated with communication 
skills and language proficiency and there is evidence that clients prefer literate and 
multilingual sex workers (Brown, 2007). Rao et al. (2003) found that sex workers in Calcutta 
who could speak English received an earnings premium. We expect there to be a positive 
correlation between good health and earnings as clients will be willing to pay a premium to 
reduce the risk of contracting an STD or HIV (Gertler et al., 2005). We expect a positive sign 




workers are better at bargaining over price, there are selection effects over time (ie. the best 
performers remain in the profession), there is a learning by doing effect or older sex workers 
compensate for declining looks through increased effort (Edlund et al., 2009).    
 
We expect that sex workers who have been married will earn more than sex workers who 
have never been married. Most married sex workers in Bangladesh are in the profession 
because of an exogenous shock, such as fleeing a violent husband or because their husband 
has died (Wahed & Bhuiya, 2007). This suggests they may have attributes considered more 
desirable by potential clients than sex workers who have perhaps joined the profession 
because they failed in the marriage market (Rao et al., 2003).  We expect that sex workers 
who have children will earn more than sex workers without children for two reasons. First, 
many sex workers who have children have, at least initially, been successful in the marriage 
market and are in the profession as a result of an exogenous shock in that they have fled 
violent relationships to protect their children. Second, several studies have found that having 
children is a major cause of weight gain among women (see studies reviewed in Weng et al., 
2004). Mechanisms proposed to explain the association between number of children and 
weight gain in women are metabolic changes associated with pregnancy and physiological 
changes associated with accommodating living with small children, such as changes in diet 
and physical exercise. In Bangladesh the most attractive sex workers are regarded as those 
who are slightly overweight, while retaining their girlish good looks.  
 
We expect that those sex workers whose mother was a sex workers will earn more because 
their mothers will provide them with networks and introduce them to rich clients. While this 
is likely to be less important among floating sex workers and at the bottom end of the market, 




workers (Brown 2005; 2007). We expect that the average number of clients per day and 
average number of days worked per month will be positively correlated with average monthly 
earnings from sex work. Income from other sources should be inversely related with average 
monthly earnings from sex work because this reduces the need to engage in sex work. 
 
The problem with estimating Equation (1) using ordinary least squares is the possible 
endogeneity of condom use, ie. Condomi may be correlated with the error term, ε1i (see Rao et 
al., 2003; Gertler et al., 2005). The correlation between unobservables and the error term 
could arise for a number of reasons. Controlling for physical attractiveness using the beauty 
variable helps us to control for the most important source of bias as in most studies this is 
regarded as an unobservable attribute. Thus, we are not concerned with the endogeneity that 
arises due to positive correlation between attractiveness, condom use and potential earnings. 
However, there can be additional sources of unobserved heterogeneity other than the 
attractiveness of the sex workers which may bias the estimates of condom use. That is, 
conditioning on X and physical attractiveness, unobservables which are correlated with 
condom use could also be correlated with the potential earnings of sex workers. We therefore 
use the instrumental variable (IV) method to deal with potential endogeniety of condom use. 
In order to have a valid IV, it must be correlated with condom use, but it should not affect sex 
workers’ wages or price per act, conditional on X and beauty, other than through its influence 
on condom use. It must also be uncorrelated with the error term in Equation (1).  
 
We use participation in a safe sex training program as an instrument for condom use. Our 
approach is the same as that employed by Rao et al. (2003) in their study of the compensating 
differential for condom use among Calcutta sex workers, where a similar safe sex training 




with sex workers in the brothels and red light districts from which participants in the current 
study are drawn. The activities of the NGOs and samites range from capacity building, rights 
based activities and advocacy to increasing awareness regarding STDs and HIV infection. 
The major tool which NGOs and samites employ to promote safe sex practices is a flip chart 
that uses a series of pictures to explain the nature and progression of the HIV virus and how 
condoms can be used to prevent the spread of HIV. When the NGOs show the flip chart as 
part of a safe sex training session, they also leave free condoms and encourage sex workers to 
use them. We exploit the random manner in which NGOs contact sex workers and show them 
flip charts, in order to identify the effect of condom use. Specifically, in order to correct for 
endogeneity of condom use we apply a two-stage procedure of IV regression where, in the 
first-stage, we estimate the probability of condom use with the flip chart variable as the 
excluded instrument. We assume that the equation determining whether the clients of the sex 
worker regularly use a condom in a linearized form is: 
Condomi = β2Xi + δ Si + ε2i            (2) 
Here Si is a binary variable indicating if the sex worker i has seen the flip chart, β2 and δ are 
vectors of unknown parameters, and ε2i is an extreme value error term. 
In order to show that viewing the flip chart is not correlated with unobserved attributes of sex 
workers, the NGOs must be shown to have adopted a nonsystematic strategy to contact sex 
workers to show them the flip charts. Interviews with representatives from the relevant NGOs 
suggested this was the case. NGO workers informed the BIDS team administering the survey 
that they visited the brothels and red light districts in an ad hoc manner and on some of these 
visits showed sex workers flip charts to educate them about condom use and HIV.  The size 
and geographical layout of the three brothels that were sites for the study is consistent with 




their ad hoc lay out, mean that there are sex workers with a full range of productive 
characteristics (such as age, attractiveness and health status) and hence earnings potential 
working in close vicinity to each other. These sex workers participate in the NGO safe sex 
training sessions, regardless of their productive characteristics. At the series of brothels at 
Jessore there are high-end and low-end brothels operating side-by-side. The NGOs workers 
visit these brothels without regard to the prices that the sex workers charge. The same is true 
for the floating sex workers in the red light districts of Dhaka where sex workers with 
different productive characteristics, and charging different prices, stand on the same street 
corner, or in the same park, with a view to soliciting clients. NGOs are interested in rights-
advocacy and increasing HIV awareness among sex workers as a population and do not 
discriminate on the basis of the sex worker’s income, age or other productive characteristics. 
Results 
Table 2 presents the first stage results for the determinants of condom use using Equation (2). 
The coefficient on the flip chart variable is positive and significant and this result is robust for 
various specifications including various combinations of control variables and fixed effects. 
Of the other variables, those sex workers who are health conscious – have regular blood tests 
and health check-ups – are more likely to have clients who regularly use condoms. Sex 
workers who reported that they charged less if their clients use condoms were less likely to 
have clients who regularly use condoms. Use of oral contraception has no impact on condom 
use, suggesting that condoms are not used for contraception, but for HIV prevention.  
 
As we are using a single instrument, there is no formal test to check whether the IV is 
orthogonal to the error term. We use the predicted value of the condom use variable in the 




variable has any direct effect on earnings from sex work. The results, which are reported in 
Table 3, indicate that viewing the flip chart has no effect of the earnings of sex workers. 
 
Table 4 presents the results from the IV estimates for Equation (1), including a range of 
control variables and fixed effects. The fixed effects include the sex worker’s district of birth, 
specific brothels and red light districts, the occupation of the client (student, blue collar, 
white collar, unemployed) and the type of sexual transaction (eg. anal, hand simulation, oral, 
vaginal or hugging and kissing). Condom use has a strong negative relationship with average 
monthly earnings. Relative to sex workers whose clients regularly use condoms, the average 
monthly income of sex workers who have clients who do not regularly use condoms was 
between 81 per cent and 154 per cent higher depending on the exact empirical specification. 
The coefficient on beauty is positive and significant in each specification. The earnings 
premium for beauty is in the range 15 per cent to 20 per cent. This result is similar to what 
Arunachalam and Shah (2010) found for sex workers in Ecuador and Mexico and is in the 
same range as the earnings premium for beauty for females in non-sex work.  
 
Of the control variables, the coefficient on education is positive and significant in the first 
specification, but this is not robust for the inclusion of additional control variables. Based on 
specifications (2) to (5), sex workers who have children earn 20 per cent to 26 per cent more 
than sex workers who do not have children. Sex workers who reported charging less if their 
clients use condoms earn between 45 per cent and 58 per cent less. For each additional client 
a sex worker sees on an average day, she earns 10 per cent to 11 per cent more, while for 
each additional day a sex worker works, she earns 6 per cent to 7 per cent more over the 




Sex workers who have regular blood tests earn between 45 per cent and 54 per cent more 
while sex workers who have regular health check-ups earn 38 per cent to 52 per cent more. 
 
Beauty is potentially serving as a proxy for self-confidence or other characteristics that 
potentially command a premium in the labour market. Previous studies that have attempted to 
control for such characteristics have generally found that they have little or no effect on the 
beauty premium for non-sex work (see eg. Hamermesh & Biddle, 1994; Leigh & Borland, 
2007). However, Arunachalam and Shah (2010) control for the sex worker’s communication 
skills, personality and physical attributes, such as height and weight, and find that the beauty 
premium is reduced for sex workers in Ecuador and Mexico. We do not have data on physical 
characteristics of the participants, but in specifications (4) and (5) we include variables 
measuring self-reported happiness, discrimination and if the sex worker reports being abused 
by clients and the police.  Respondents who report higher happiness, feel less discrimination 
and suffer less abuse by clients and the police are likely to have more pleasant demeanours or 
dispositions when interacting with clients.  Of these variables, the only variable that is 
significant is police abuse. In specification (5) sex workers who report being abused by the 
police earn 32 per cent less than those who do not suffer police abuse.  The beauty premium, 
though, is similar with the addition of these variables. This result suggests that to the extent 
that these variables proxy for the demeanour or disposition of the sex worker, controlling for 
this characteristic has little effect on the returns to attractiveness. 
 
That the number clients a sex worker has is a major predictor of average monthly earnings 
suggests that there is an excess supply of sex workers. This is consistent with the point made 
above that that the sex worker industry is very competitive. It follows that competition may 




premium could manifest itself not only in wages, but also in who is in the industry at the time 
of the survey. As a result, the least attractive sex workers will not be sampled if they have 
already exited the industry. If this is the case, this may suggest a much higher premium to 
beauty than can be estimated with current sex workers. One way to examine this issue is to 
compare the beauty premium for sex workers whose mothers were, and were not, sex 
workers. If competition is forcing less attractive sex workers out of the industry, we would 
expect that beauty would be more important for sex workers who entered the industry without 
their mother’s connections. However, this does not seem to be the case. Of the 283 sex 
workers, just 18 have mothers who were also sex workers. We do not find that sex workers 
without mothers in the industry were more attractive than sex workers whose mothers were 
also sex workers.  Rather, we find that sex workers with mothers in the industry were more 
attractive (average attractiveness on a scale of 1-4 was 2.72 for sex workers with mothers in 
the industry as opposed to 2.25 for sex workers whose mothers were not in the industry). An 
explanation for this result could that in general more attractive girls will have more success in 
the marriage market, while less attractive girls will become sex workers, but girls whose 
mothers are sex workers will have less marriage opportunities because of the social stigma. 
 
In Table 5 we present two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates for Equation (1) in which we 
consider characteristics of the sex worker interacted with the flip chart variable as 
instruments for condom use rather than simply using the binary flipchart variable as an 
instrument. Based on the specification tests reported in Table 5, we conclude that the 
instruments satisfy the relevance and exogeneity conditions and, as such, are valid 
instruments. Interacting sex worker characteristics with the flip chart variable allows 
differences in characteristics of the sex worker to affect condom use through the flip chart 




brothel with both the beauty and condom variables to allow for differences between sex 
workers in brothels and floating sex workers.  The average monthly income of sex workers 
who have clients who regularly use condoms was between 20 per cent and 30 per cent less 
depending on the specification. The interaction term brothel×beauty is statistically 
insignificant indicating that beauty has no differential effect based of whether one works in a 
brothel or as a floating sex worker. The results imply that the earnings premium for beauty is 
in the range 16 per cent to 23 per cent, which is similar to the results in Table 4.  
 
Table 6 reports the 2SLS estimates for Equation (1) where the dependent variable is the 
average transaction price, rather than average monthly earnings. While we only report the 
coefficients on beauty and condom use, the full specifications in each column correspond to 
the columns reported in Table 4. The coefficient on the earnings premium for beauty is 
positive and significant, indicating that this result is robust to the measure of economic return. 
The results suggest that the beauty premium per transaction is 11 per cent to 15 per cent. The 
coefficient on condom use is negative and significant in the first specification. The coefficient 
on condom use in specification (1) suggests that sex workers whose clients regularly use a 
condom earn 42 per cent less per transaction. This figure is a mid-point between the 24 per 
cent penalty for condom use reported in Gertler et al. (2005) and the 79 per cent penalty for 
condom use reported in Rao et al. (2003). The finding for condom use, however, is not robust 
to the inclusion of additional variables. Overall, the results for condom use in Table 5 
indicate that sex workers whose clients regularly use condoms have fewer clients. We 
observe more significant results for economic returns to unprotected sex using monthly 
earnings which are determined by both average transaction price and number of 





Next we examine whether the earnings premium for beauty is due to employer discrimination 
(ie. employers derive a taste based utility for interacting with beautiful employees). If the 
earnings premium for beauty reflects solely employer discrimination, there should be no 
premium for the self-employed (Biddle & Hamermesh, 1998). In Bangladesh most floating 
sex workers make arrangements with clients without going through intermediaries (pimps), 
and, as such, can be regarded as self-employed. Sex workers in brothels (adhiya and chukris) 
are in a labour relation with the sardarnis  and, as such, can be regarded as employed 
(Kotiswaran, 2008). In the case of the adhiya, the sardarnis take half the price per transaction 
in return for providing them with a room, while in the case of the chukris, the sardarnis 
contracts with an agent or the girl’s relatives for the sex worker’s services.  
Table 7 presents beauty ratings and condom use according to whether the sex worker works 
in a brothel or is floating. Floating sex workers score lower on beauty. This finding is 
consistent with Arunachalam and Shah’s (2010) findings for sex workers in Ecuador and 
Mexico. It suggests that the sardarnis might be discriminating against less attractive sex 
workers when employing adhiya or contracting for the services of chukris. There is weak 
evidence that floating sex workers earn more than sex workers in brothels. The coefficient on 
the dummy variable for brothels is negative and weakly significant in specification 4 in Table 
3 and specifications 3 and 4 in Table 5, but it is insignificant in the other specifications. 
Moreover, when beauty is interacted with the dummy variable for brothel in Table 5, the 
interaction term is statistically insignificant, suggesting that the beauty premium for brothel 
sex workers and floating sex workers is not statistically different. Overall, these results are 
consistent with employer discrimination explaining the beauty premium. 
Table 7 suggests that the prevalence of condom use is statistically higher for sex workers in 




characteristics, but it cannot be explained on the basis of the extent to which sex workers in 
brothels and floating sex workers see permanent clients. Sex workers in brothels have more 
permanent clients than do floating sex workers (see Table 1). Moreover, when condom use is 
interacted with brothel in Table 5, the results suggest that average monthly income of sex 
workers in brothels whose clients regularly used condoms was considerably higher than 
floating sex workers whose clients regularly used condoms.  This result is robust to the 
inclusion of a range of controls including client characteristics. This result might suggest 
greater acceptance of wearing a condom among men who frequent brothels compared with 
men who pay for sex with floating prostitutes; or it might mean that sex workers in brothels 
have more bargaining power than their floating counterparts when negotiating with clients 
over safe sex either because they are more attractive and, as such, are better bargainers or 
because brothels are a more controlled environment in which to complete the transaction. 
 
In lab experiments, from which most of the evidence on the relationship between 
attractiveness and bargaining comes, the stakes are relatively minor. This is not the case in 
the commercial sex market in which the risk of being infected with HIV makes the stakes 
extremely high. If attractive people have more bargaining power, perhaps because they are 
better negotiators, it would follow that more attractive sex workers would be able to charge a 
higher premium for the risk of engaging in unprotected sex.  Table 8 reports results where, in 
addition to beauty, condom use and the usual controls, we include as an additional regressor 
an interaction term between beauty and unprotected sex. The results for the interaction term 
between beauty and unprotected sex indicate that attractive sex workers receive an earnings 





There are at least two possible explanations for this result. One is that attractive sex workers 
have more bargaining power when negotiating the transaction price with clients. In this 
respect, more attractive people have been shown to be better placed to bargain with others, 
possibly because more attractive people are better negotiators (Rosenblat, 2008). Several 
arguments have been proffered linking one’s looks with negotiating skills (Rosenblat, 2008). 
First, physical attractiveness and vocal attractiveness are correlated (Zuckerman & Driver, 
1989). Hence, physically attractive people are likely to be regarded as more effective 
communicators. Second, physically attractive people receive more attention from parents, 
friends and co-workers, which can enhance their acquisition of social skills in childhood and 
adolescence (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986). Because perceptions of physical attractiveness are 
stable through childhood and adulthood (Adams, 1977a, 1977b), it is likely that people 
considered to be good looking will have better communications skills when bargaining 
(Rosenblat, 2008).  Third, attractiveness is a strong predictor of self-esteem, which, in turn, 
influences dominance behaviour, manifest in acting in an assertive manner when bargaining 
(Santor & Walker, 1999). Fourth, employers might regard attractive employees as more 
persuasive, even if the message that they are delivering has similar content to employees who 
are less attractive because a ‘beauty-is-good’ stereotype acts as a cue that enhances the 
effectiveness of attractive people as negotiators (Langlois et al., 2000). 
 
In the sociology literature, Hakim (2010) has recently introduced the term ‘erotic capital’. 
While both men and women can have erotic capital, Hakim (2010) argues that women have 
more erotic capital and that this gives them a significant advantage in negotiations with men. 
While there are different aspects of erotic capital, beauty is a central feature. The main 
argument is that in choosing a mate men prefer women who are physically attractive, while 




attractive ‘buys’ desirable males. Hakim (2010) applies the concept of erotic capital to 
bargaining between partners in a couple. She argues that sexual access is typically wives’ 
principal bargaining tool.  A wife might withhold or offer sex in order to persuade her spouse 
to give her what she wants (Arndt, 2009). This works because men’s demand for sexual 
activity exceeds that of women. Based on an extensive survey of myriad sources, Baumeister 
et al. (2001) concluded that male sex drive is more intense and uncompromising than female 
sex drive.  While the transaction over sex in the marriage market is likely to be subtle, it is 
explicit in the commercial sex market. Hakim (2010) suggests that sex work is a prime 
example of an occupation in which attractive females are able to exploit their erotic capital.  
 
Andreoni and Petrie (2008) found that attractive people are expected to be more cooperative; 
On the surface, this finding would suggest that clients would expect attractive sex workers to 
agree to unprotected sex over and above unattractive sex workers; making it, all-things-
being-equal, more difficult for an attractive sex worker to charge a premium for engaging in 
the risky act because clients expect them to be cooperative.  But all things are not equal and if 
attractiveness increases negotiating power, this might explain why attractive people can get 
away with being less cooperative. While it is not an issue we can address here, the 
relationship between being cooperative and negotiating power deserves further investigation. 
Alternatively, it may be that attractive sex workers are not, in fact, cooperative at all. Van 
Kleef et al. (2007) found that people with a peripheral group status within an attractive group 
send less cooperative messages to opponents than prototypical group members. If one 
considers that the very attractive are the peripheral of the sex worker group, then it follows 





In the results it is difficult to isolate the returns to beauty because more attractive sex workers 
are selling a better product from the returns to beauty because more attractive sex workers are 
better negotiators. In brothels, both the adhiya and the chukris negotiate directly with the 
client. In a typical brothel, there are cubicles on either side of a throughway with sex workers 
out the front of each cubicle. The sex workers will attempt to persuade the potential client to 
enter into a transaction. Some additional information will sometimes be provided by madams 
or pimps to attempt to persuade the client (such as ‘this girl is new to this brothel’ or ‘this is a 
good price’), but normally the madam will not get involved until the price is agreed. In the 
case of the chukris, though, the madam may get involved earlier and the ability of the chukris 
to negotiate is reduced because of the power relationship between the madam and sex worker. 
Floating sex workers in Bangladesh do not normally use pimps, so all negotiation with the 
client is done by the sex worker. Hence, it might be argued that negotiation by the sex worker 
is less important in agreeing on the price in brothels than on the street, particularly in brothels 
with a large number of chukris. On this basis, the results in Table 5 provide an indirect, and 
inexact, way to separate out the returns to productivity from the returns to superior 
negotiation. Consider two sex workers that are equally attractive, but one works in a brothel 
and the other on the street. One would expect returns to be greater on the street than in the 
brothel. On the street there is a given return to beauty from productivity plus a return to 
beauty from negotiation. In the brothel, there is a given return to beauty from productivity 
plus a lesser return to beauty from negotiation, assuming that direct negotiation between the 
sex worker and client is less important in the brothel. In Table 5, the coefficient on brothel 
interacted with beauty is negative, consistent with this conjecture, but the sign is statistically 
insignificant. However, it is not clear whether the sign is insignificant because returns to 




better product or because the brothel/floating sex worker distinction does not adequately 
capture the difference in economic returns between the productivity and negotiation effect. 
 
Another explanation for this result is that attractiveness and risky sex are complements in the 
client’s utility function (Gertler et al., 2005). Evidence from experiments is consistent with 
the results here and suggests that risk taking behaviour among males increases in the presence 
of attractive females. Bertrand et al. (2009) found that males were much more willing to 
borrow money when the bank’s advertising material included a photo of an attractive female. 
Including a photo of an attractive female in the advertising material was found to increase 
loan demand by males by an amount equivalent to about a 25 per cent reduction in the 
interest rate. Wilson and Daly (2004) also found that males discount future monetary 
outcomes more steeply in the presence of attractive females. Their study initially assessed 
participants’ temporal discounting rates using choices between smaller sooner amounts of 
money and larger but more delayed amounts. Participants then viewed pictures of attractive 
or unattractive members of the opposite sex, while a control group viewed pictures of 
appealing or unappealing cars. Participants then re-evaluated immediate and delayed 
monetary choices and a second, post-task, discount rate was calculated. Only men who 
viewed attractive women displayed a significant increase in impatience and were more likely 
to accept smaller immediate outcomes. Females and controls did not exhibit this effect. 
 
Wilson and Daly (2004) argued that their result was because attractive females activate a 
mating mindset in males causing them to overvalue immediate rewards. If risk-taking 
behaviour is a desirable characteristic in a mate, then males may become more risk-tolerant in 
the presence of attractive females as a signal to potential mates (cf. McAlvanah, 2009). 




order to impress her to get her to mate with him. However, the mating mindset dictates that 
individuals will look for characteristics in the opposite sex that suggest they may have ‘good 
genes’ (Gangestad & Simpson, 2000). For women, male attributes which suggest ‘good 
genes’ tend to centre on strength and stature. For men, female attributes which suggest ‘good 
genes’ centre on physical attractiveness. Evolutionary psychologists have suggested that men 
place much more emphasis than women on physical attractiveness in looking for a mate to 
pass on his gene pool. Men will want to mate with women who are attractive and who will 
produce attractive offspring who, in turn, will find it easier to carry on their genetic line 
(Buss, 1999). Men who frequent brothels and red light districts are not consciously doing so 
with the intention of impregnating attractive sex workers. The mating mindset, though, works 
at a subconscious level. As Scruton (2004, p. 18) puts it: “Human beings are animals…we 
are governed by the laws of biology, and even our thoughts and emotions are the result of 
electrochemical processes in the brain”. That, for men, the evolutionary mechanism is 
subconsciously associated with impregnating an attractive female, suggests that female 
attractiveness and risky sex will be complements when purchasing sex from sex workers. 
Conclusion 
In this study we have examined the economic returns to attractiveness and risky sex in the 
Bangladesh commercial sex market. Given the intimate and personal nature of the service 
transacted, commercial sex work is a good labour market in which to test for a beauty 
premium. We find that a beauty premium exists in the commercial sex market, but the size of 
the premium is within the bounds of the beauty premium for females not performing sex 
work. We also find that the beauty premium is being driven by employer discrimination. This 
is consistent with the sardarnis contracting with more attractive women, or their agents or 
families, to fill the adhiya and chukri roles, while less attractive women wanting to enter the 




transactions potentially carry high risk if a condom is not used. Our results suggest that there 
is an earnings premium for sex workers who sell unprotected sex. Moreover, more attractive 
sex workers charge a higher premium for selling unprotected sex. This result is consistent 
with either attractive sex workers having more bargaining/negotiating power or attractiveness 
and risky sex being complements for males in the presence of attractive women. 
 
A potential limitation of the results reported here is that while we assume that unprotected 
sex to be perceived as a risky activity by sex workers, surveys of sex workers have found that 
they view health risks, such as the potential to contract HIV, as a low priority relative to other 
risks such as violence (Sanders, 2004; Busza, 2005). This issue would seem to be particularly 
relevant to Bangladesh where Jenkins and Rahman (2002) note that the overall safety (in 
terms of violence) in Bangladeshi brothels is declining. This can be seen in terms of proximal 
versus distal perceptions of risk. From the sex worker’s perspective, if she contracts HIV, the 
median survival time is approximately 10 years; however, in the worst cases of physical 
violence immediate death is a distinct possibility.  Hence the propensity to engage in 
unprotected sex might not be interpreted with the same risk saliency by sex workers and non 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Variables  Floating  Brothel   
      Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Price  Average transaction price (in taka)
1 96.41  104.74  82.93  42.29 
Price (with condom)  Average transaction price  with  condom  91.48  76.69 73.86 32.87 
Price (without condom)  Average transaction price without condom  119.37  92.93 90.81 36.36 
Sex income  Monthly income from sex work (in taka)  7355.2  6383.6  8776.8  5956.7 
Client numbers  Number of clients per day  4.42  2.54  4.05  1.64 
Days worked  Number of days worked in a month  20.38  6.61  25.62  5.11 
Charge less  Do you charge less with a condom? (yes=1)  0.53  0.5  0.35  0.48 
Flipchart  Have you seen the flipchart? (yes=1)  0.91  0.28  0.93  0.25 
Age  Age  (years)  25.95  7.26 27.8 7.83 
Experience  Years in profession  7.72  5.79  12.31  8.14 
Married  Have you ever been married? (yes =1)  0.26  0.73  0.67 0.47 
Education Years  of  education  2.27  3.18 1.81 2.49 
Child  Do you have children? (yes=1)  0.67  0.47  0.65  0.48 
Muslim  Are you Muslim? (yes=1)  0.98  0.14  0.93  0.25 
Mother sex worker  Was your mother a sex worker? (yes=1)  0.01  0.08  0.14  0.35 
Parent attitudes 
Do your parents approve of your 
profession?  (yes=1)  0.73  0.94 0.59 0.86 
Sterilized  Have you been sterilized? (yes=1)  0.9  0.3  0.96  0.2 
Regular check-up  Do you have regular health checks? (yes=1)  0.27  0.45  0.46  0.5 
HIV test  Have you been tested for HIV? (yes=1)  0.63  0.48  0.65  0.48 
Blood test  Do you have regular blood tests?  (yes=1)  0.87  0.33 0.74 0.44 
STD  Do you have a STD? (yes=1)  0.33  0.47  0.25  0.44 
Permanent client  Do you have permanent clients?  (yes=1)  0.69  0.46 0.78 0.42 
Rich client  Do you have rich clients?  (yes=1)  0.3  0.46 0.48 0.5 
Contraception  Do you take oral contraception?  (yes=1)  0.37  0.48 0.23 0.42 
Abortion  Have you had an abortion?  (yes=1)  0.25  0.44 0.46 0.5 
Miscarried  Have you had a miscarriage?  (yes=1)  0.13  0.34 0.22 0.42 
Private partners  Number of partners in  private  life  2.08  2.68 0.98 0.83 
Other income  Income from other sources (in taka)  376.3  684.8  1108.5  4389.7 
Police abuse  Have you been abused by police?  (yes=1)  0.86  0.35 0.78 0.42 
Discrimination  Do you feel discriminated against? (yes=1)  0.81 0.39  0.3 0.9 
Client abuse  Have you been abused by clients?  0.8  0.4  0.70 0.46 
Client attractive  Have you found a client attractive? (yes=1)  0.64  0.48  0.33 0.47 
Client age  Average age of clients (years)  29.58  4.87  29.92  5.05 
Happy  Are you satisfied with your life? (yes=1)  0.06  0.23  0.25 0.44 
Number of obs.   160  123    
 




Table 2: First-Stage Results 
 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Flipchart 0.364**  0.260*  0.260*  0.227+  0.194+ 
  (0.064) (0.091) (0.095) (0.098) (0.101) 
Beauty  0.028 -0.002 0.005 0.013 0.007 
  (0.027) (0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.027) 
Age  0.008 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.007 
  (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Experience  -0.012 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 
  (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Married  -0.006 -0.017 -0.035 -0.041 -0.038 
  (0.071) (0.062) (0.084) (0.092) (0.077) 
Education  -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 
  (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Child 0.082  0.087  0.110+  0.113+  0.094 
  (0.085) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.054) 
Muslim  -0.107 -0.069 -0.023 -0.039 0.016 
  (0.163) (0.109) (0.113) (0.133) (0.113) 
Mother  sex  worker  0.031 -0.027 -0.058 -0.053 -0.046 
  (0.173) (0.151) (0.174) (0.172) (0.167) 
Parent attitudes  0.026  0.032 0.024 0.024 0.033 
  (0.038) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) 
Sterilized  -0.027 -0.095  -0.108+  -0.077 -0.068 
  (0.040) (0.050) (0.047) (0.045) (0.044) 
Regular  check-up  0.207**  0.205* 0.200* 0.202* 0.119+ 
  (0.039) (0.067) (0.065) (0.067) (0.059) 
Charge  less  -0.323** -0.262* -0.301**  -0.300** -0.273* 
  (0.074) (0.089) (0.077) (0.076) (0.082) 
Other  income  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Client  numbers  -0.037+  -0.024 -0.029 -0.036  -0.045* 
  (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) 
Days  worked  0.017 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.013 
  (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
HIV  test    -0.062 -0.070 -0.095 -0.111 
    (0.067) (0.059) (0.073) (0.061) 
Contraception    -0.093 -0.089 -0.092 -0.107 
    (0.064) (0.071) (0.074) (0.069) 
Abortion    -0.046 -0.042 -0.045 -0.020 
    (0.043) (0.062) (0.059) (0.056) 
Miscarried    0.207 0.210 0.208 0.238 
    (0.141) (0.143) (0.154) (0.150) 
Blood  test    0.312** 0.340** 0.354**  0.258* 
    (0.070) (0.082) (0.086) (0.101) 
STD    0.000 -0.017 -0.011 -0.027 
    (0.045) (0.046) (0.054) (0.057) 
Permanent client      -0.004  -0.012  0.015 
      (0.058) (0.066) (0.075) 
Rich  client      -0.035 -0.042 -0.011 
      (0.081) (0.075) (0.064) 
Client  abuse      0.047 0.070 0.122 
      (0.086) (0.077) (0.071) 
Client  attractive      0.035 0.047 0.029 
      (0.031) (0.030) (0.035) 
Client  age      0.006 0.007 0.005 
      (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Police  abuse      -0.038  -0.030 
      (0.070)  (0.078) 
Discrimination      0.025  0.048 
      (0.077)  (0.075) 
Private  partners      0.005  -0.003 
      (0.011)  (0.011) 
Happy      0.017  0.015 
      (0.086)  (0.081) 
Brothel(=1)  -0.073 0.045 0.050 0.034   




Place of birth fixed effects? Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Sex type fixed effects?  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Client occupn. fixed effects?  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Area  fixed  effects?  No No No No Yes 
Observations  242 242 240 237 237 
R-squared  0.531 0.618 0.632 0.628 0.650 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the sex worker’s area of residence level. **, *, + indicate significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.  
 













Notes: Regression in both stages include the full specification as in column (5) of IV/first-stage regression. The first-stage 
involves estimating the probability of condom use, which is then used in the second stage with additional the flipchart 
variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the sex worker’s area of residence level. **, *, + indicates 





Table 4: (Log of Monthly) Earnings from Sex Work (where condom use is instrumented) 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Condom -0.813*  -1.143**  -0.944**  -1.199*  -1.541* 
  (0.323) (0.421) (0.343) (0.521)  (0.648) 
Beauty  0.195** 0.166* 0.159** 0.183* 0.152* 
  (0.061) (0.065) (0.061) (0.074)  (0.075) 
Age  -0.004 -0.005 -0.000 -0.005  0.001 
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)  (0.009) 
Experience -0.009  -0.011  -0.018*  -0.015+  -0.023* 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.011) 
Married  0.010 -0.014 -0.095 -0.114  -0.107 
  (0.120) (0.112) (0.104) (0.111)  (0.120) 
Education  0.026*  0.015 0.014 0.011  0.003 
  (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)  (0.022) 
Child 0.157  0.203+  0.209*  0.268*  0.264+ 
  (0.116) (0.111) (0.089) (0.120)  (0.135) 
Muslim  0.162 0.133 0.191 0.053  0.141 
  (0.147) (0.173) (0.144) (0.171)  (0.165) 
Mother sex worker  0.026  -0.049  -0.074  -0.043  -0.093 
  (0.185) (0.194) (0.154) (0.190)  (0.221) 
Parent attitudes  0.006  0.013 -0.016 -0.001  0.046 
  (0.047) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)  (0.043) 
Sterilized  0.107 0.045 0.063 0.055  0.031 
  (0.122) (0.198) (0.181) (0.175)  (0.178) 
Regular  check-up  0.462** 0.496** 0.459** 0.516** 0.375* 
  (0.110) (0.187) (0.152) (0.200)  (0.154) 
Charge  less  -0.457* -0.468* -0.444* -0.503*  -0.575* 
  (0.191) (0.205) (0.174) (0.220)  (0.242) 
Other  income  0.000+  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Client numbers  0.121*  0.119**  0.114**  0.105*  0.071 
  (0.052) (0.042) (0.039) (0.050)  (0.045) 
Days  worked  0.063** 0.060** 0.059** 0.066**  0.072** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021)  (0.022) 
HIV  test    -0.070 -0.088 -0.097  -0.160 
    (0.130) (0.105) (0.137)  (0.126) 
Contraception   -0.164  -0.203  -0.237+  -0.246+ 
    (0.127) (0.142) (0.143)  (0.129) 
Abortion    -0.112 -0.104 -0.129  -0.084 
    (0.079) (0.090) (0.100)  (0.108) 
Miscarried    0.218 0.104 0.165  0.284 
    (0.170) (0.111) (0.195)  (0.285) 
Blood test    0.515**  0.448**  0.540*  0.509+ 
    (0.186) (0.159) (0.235)  (0.266) 
STD    0.082 0.074 0.090  0.038 
    (0.111) (0.092) (0.105)  (0.120) 
Permanent client      -0.032  -0.018  -0.025 
     (0.049)  (0.071)  (0.117) 
Rich client      0.039  0.036  0.128 
     (0.080)  (0.097)  (0.097) 
Client abuse      -0.004  0.113  0.100 
     (0.028)  (0.080)  (0.133) 
Client attractive      0.025  0.033  0.044 
     (0.051)  (0.066)  (0.071) 
Client age      0.003  0.006  -0.002 
     (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
Police  abuse      -0.253  -0.320+ 
      (0.181)  (0.167) 
Discrimination      -0.064  -0.024 
      (0.103)  (0.126) 
Private  partners      -0.001  -0.011 
      (0.017)  (0.022) 
Happy      -0.119  -0.039 




Brothel  (=1)  -0.276 -0.076 -0.140  -0.181+   
  (0.172) (0.164) (0.102) (0.108)   
Place of birth fixed effects? Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Sex type fixed effects?  No Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Client occupn. fixed effects? No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Area  fixed  effects?  No No No No  Yes 
Observations  242 242 240 237  237 
R-squared  0.474 0.415 0.545 0.461  0.350 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the sex worker’s area of residence level. **, *, + indicate significance at the 
1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.  
 
 
Table 5: Two-stage Least Square Estimates Using Individual Characteristics Interacted 
with Flipchart Variable  
 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Condom  -0.635+ -0.846** -0.856** -1.098** -1.196** 
  (0.343)  (0.297) (0.253) (0.314) (0.301) 
Beauty  0.225**  0.193**  0.167* 0.205* 0.210* 
  (0.031)  (0.049) (0.067) (0.084) (0.092) 
Brothel -0.384  -0.355  -0.551+ -0.644+  -0.490 
  (0.316)  (0.374) (0.305) (0.330) (0.392) 
brothel ×beauty  -0.074  -0.048 -0.033 -0.083 -0.156 
  (0.086)  (0.097) (0.101) (0.113) (0.141) 
brothel × condom  0.445  0.475+  0.642** 0.857** 0.926** 
  (0.283)  (0.244) (0.215) (0.288) (0.309) 
Angrist-Pischke Test
 a  0.0053  0.0049 0.0040 0.0083 0.0125 
Kleibergen-Paap F  statistic  14.23  14.60 15.91 11.80  9.93 
Sargan-Hansen Test 
a  0.4302  0.6671 0.9115 0.8281 0.5778 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test
 a  0.0040  0.0001 0.0001 0.0046 0.0000 
Observations  242  242 240 237 237 
R-squared  0.557  0.541 0.596 0.544 0.539 
 
Notes: 
a p-values.   Each column corresponds to the specification in Table 4. Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at the sex worker’s  area of residence level.   **, *, + indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, 
respectively. Condom is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the sex worker practices safe sex, beauty is a categorical 
variable, measured on a scale of 1 to 4. 
 
Table 6: (Log of) Average Transaction Price 
 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Condom  -0.415*  -0.546 -0.430 -0.584 -0.777 
  (0.207) (0.358) (0.326) (0.416) (0.578) 
Beauty  0.153** 0.137** 0.128** 0.136**  0.112* 
  (0.045) (0.042) (0.041) (0.049) (0.053) 
Observations  242 242 240 237 237 
R-squared  0.443 0.456 0.544 0.498 0.462 
Notes: Each column corresponds to the specification in Table 4. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the sex 






Table 7: Beauty and Condom Use by Sector 
(1) (2) (3) (4=|2-3|) 
Overall   Floating  Brothel  Difference
Condom use (=1)  0.69  0.64  0.76  0.12** 
Beauty (on a scale 1-4)  2.28  2.13  2.49  0.36*** 
not beautiful (=1)  19.08  23.13  13.82  9.31*** 
overall okay (=2)  43.46  48.13  37.4  10.73*** 
beautiful  (=3)  27.56 21.88 34.96  13.08*** 
very beautiful (=4)  9.89  6.88  13.82  6.94*** 
Number of Obs.  283  160  123   
*** indicates difference is statistically significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level 
 
Table 8: The Beauty Premium for Unprotected Sex 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Condom -0.675  -0.711+  -0.576+ -0.674+ -0.765* 
 (0.367)  (0.310)  (0.288)  (0.319)  (0.264) 
Beauty 0.255  0.214  0.190  0.228  0.180 
 (0.136)  (0.132)  (0.145)  (0.154)  (0.141) 
beauty* non-condom use  0.233+  0.328*  0.355*  0.321+  0.370+ 
 (0.112)  (0.130)  (0.144)  (0.148)  (0.166) 
Include controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Place of birth FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sex type FE   No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Client type FE  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Area FE  No  No  No  No  Yes 
R-squared 0.541  0.699  0.734  0.747  0.763 
Standard errors are clustered at the sex worker’s place of residence level and reported in parentheses.   ***, **, 
+ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively. Non condom use is a dummy variable set equal to 
1 if the sex worker does not practice safe sex. 
 
 